This article offers a critical reassessment of the established historiography on the Allied victory at the Battle of the Alma during the Crimean War. The study’s relevance lies in challenging the dominant narrative that attributes the Russian defeat primarily to technical backwardness, notably the lack of rifled firearms. This technological determinism overlooks other crucial factors like tactical skill, training, and morale. The article aims to re-evaluate the victory’s key factors, shifting the focus from weapon superiority to the comprehensive tactical prowess of elite French infantry units — the Zouaves and light infantry. The methodology is based on a multifaceted analysis of a wide range of sources, including French, Russian, and British documents, military regulations, participant memoirs, and historiographical materials. The core findings refute the prevailing view. The author compellingly argues that the decisive factor was not the Allies’ rifles, but the Zouaves’ superior combat proficiency, tactical flexibility, individual initiative, and mastered skill in bayonet combat, all honed in North African colonial campaigns. Specific battle episodes demonstrate that the Zouaves often deliberately forsook their firepower advantage to launch swift, unexpected, and effective melee assaults. Concurrently, the study deconstructs the entrenched stereotype of the Russian bayonet’s unconditional dominance. The research concludes that the tactical innovation and professional skill of the “African” troops were the true determinants of the victory at the Alma.