




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SAID-BEK SHAMIL... HERO OR AN ADVENTURER?



He was officially known as Mehmed Said Shamil. People called him as Said-Bek Shamil in the Caucasus during the months he had spent there. Here, he will be named simply as Said Shamil in the way he has been widely known in the life of the North Caucasian immigration. He is the son of Muhammed

Kamil, the youngest son of Imam Shamil, the legendary Avar leader of the Russo-Caucasian Wars. Despite Said Shamil's Turkish citizenship, it's incredibly strange that no single archival document exists about him in the researchable state archives of the Republic of Turkey. What has been known about this controversial character of the North Caucasian immigration up until recently ago was all based on oral historiography and subjective narratives. When new archival sources became available at the French, Polish and Russian archives, it became possible to have a better opinion about the activities of Said Shamil during the years of the Bolshevik invasion of the Caucasus and the interwar period of the world.

Said Shamil was born from Muhammed Kamil Pasha's marriage with Nebiha Hanum. Some historians claim that it is highly probable that his mother was originally a Dagestani, while others claim that she was a Circassian. However, there has been no evidence confirming these claims with



Muhammed Kamil Pasha & his son Mehmed Said. *Istanbul, 1916*

credible sources. In a letter communication between Said Shamil's uncles, Gazi Muhammed and Muhammed Shafi, it had been stated Muhammed Kamil was going to marry the 13-year-old daughter of a teacher named Muhammed Said Efendi living in Medina¹. So, the only credible information about his mother is that she was the daughter of a teacher from Medina which makes all statements claiming Nebiha Hanum's ethnicity as Circassian or Dagestani hypothetical.

After spending his childhood in the Arab lands Said Shamil came to Istanbul to have a better education. Although he claims in his own statements that he had his education at Galatasaray High School (Mekteb-i Sultani), this information could not be verified by the records of Galatasaray High School.

Said Shamil became familiar with the North Caucasian émigré circles only after he came to Istanbul. Thanks to the kinship established between the Shamil and Shaply families, Said Shamil became one of the regulars of the Circassian Union and Solidarity Association (Çerkes İttihad ve Teavün Cemiyeti — ÇİTC) during his education in Istanbul².

Due to the marriage of Gazi Muhammed's daughter Amire Nafiset with Osman Ferit Pasha, the imperial city guard of Medina and a member

¹ Шамил Имамасул Лъималазул Кагътал. МахIачхъала, 2017. Гь. 157.

² In Asia Minor, the expression «Circassian» has been used as an exonym that included the entire North Caucasus Immigration, unlike the usage in the North Caucasus which implies only the Adyge nations.



Back row (standing from the left): Sadeddin Bey, Said Shamil, Shaply Hussein Tosun, Suleiman Bey, Amin Bey, Resul Bey, Front row (sitting from the left): Akhmed Fevzi Pasha, Mehmed Reshid Bey, Abdulmejid Chermoyev, Muhammed Kady Dibirov, Isa Ruhi Pasha, Temur Pasha. *Istanbul, May 1918*

of the Shaply family, one of the prominent Ubykh families, Shaply Hussein Tosun Bey has guided and mentored Said Shamil during his stay in Istanbul.

It was quite remarkable that 17-year-old Said Shamil was among the many experienced politicians and statesmen in the photograph taken with the members of the ÇITC, in memory of the members of the North Caucasian Government's visit to Istanbul in May 1918. Despite some information that claims that Muhammed Kamil Pasha moved first to Damascus and then to Istanbul with the beginning of the Arab Revolt, a British archival document dated 18 December 1918 states that Muhammed Kamil Pasha was still in Damascus on this date. Besides, the same archival source proves that Muhammed Kamil Pasha, who has not performed any active role among the North Caucasian émigré circles at the earlier stages of his life, tried to play a very decisive role by the end of the 1st World War. Muhammed Kamil Pasha in his letter to the British Government stated that he was ready to provide his service if the British Government would provide the necessary support. The youngest son of the legendary Imam declared that he could start and assume the leadership of an anti-Bolshevik resistance in the North Caucasus where the

name of his deceased father's name is still very influential on the local population³.

There is no clue about if the British command in the Middle East responded to the application of Muhammed Kamil, but in the last National Assembly held in the Kayis-Yurt region of Chechnya on May 10–11, 1920, the participants decided to continue the resistance against the Bolshevik occupation and to invite the youngest son of Imam Shamil to embrace the spiritual leadership of the resistance movement against the communists. Muhammed Kamil declined the invitation by attributing his weak health condition, and he proposed his 19-year-old son, Said Shamil, to his place⁴. Since Muhammed Kamil lived for another 31 years after that date, it does not seem very realistic to consider his weak health conditions as an argument for his refusal of the invitation of the rebels. As a matter of fact, in the telegram sent by the French High Commissioner Abel Chevalley to Prime Minister Aristide Briand on February 11, 1921, he stated that the North Caucasus Revolutionary Committee in Tbilisi considers one of the reasons for the failure of the rebellion is that the French command center in Istanbul discovered Said Shamil in October 1919, and brought him to Dagestan⁵. From these statements, it is well understood that there were many different dynamics in the background of Muhammed Kamil's rejection of the invitation and that Said Shamil left for the North Caucasus under the preference and protection of the French occupation forces in Istanbul. It must also be considered that ÇİTC's representatives had been negotiating issues such as the return of the North Caucasian immigrants to the homeland and the alliance against the Bolshevik occupation with the Entente in Istanbul in the same period. It is understood that Said Shamil was supposed to undertake a coordination function between the Entente, the Caucasian immigration in the Ottoman lands, and the rebels in the Caucasus. Said Shamil's undertaking the spiritual leadership of the North Caucasian resistance can be an argument only in the abstract expressions in the historiography based on the rhetoric of heroism. Additionally, it is obvious that a 19-year-old young man cannot provide anything but moral support to the people under the name «Shamil» in the presence of dozens of other experienced and knowledgeable political, military figures, and

³ Public Record Office. FO. 681289. L. 313–314.

⁴ *Hızal* A.H. Kuzey Kafkasya Hürriyet ve İstiklal Davası. Ankara, 1961. S. 81–82.

⁵ Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères de France (AMAEF). Ser. Z. Car. 653. Dos. 2. F. 150–151.

spiritual leaders who took part in the North Caucasian resistance against Bolshevism.

Said Shamil, who arrived in Tbilisi in June 1920 and stayed there for 3 months, could reach Dagestan only by September due to the dangerous environment on the way to the north. It is not possible to give any specific example where Said Shamil commanded a considerable military operation and gained any success in the conflicts between the mountain resistance and the Bolshevik forces during his 7 months stay in the mountains of Dagestan and Chechnya. There is also no single statement supporting Said Shamil's direct interference in the military confrontations in the Bolshevik figures' works such as Samurski Efendiyev, Todorski, Taho-Godi, and Kashkaev, who conveyed the events of the period in detail, albeit from a Bolshevik point of view. One of the contemporary figures of the North Caucasian immigration in Turkey who had the opportunity to work closely with Said Shamil in the last years of his life, Mehdi Nuzhet Chetinbash's statements in an interview dated June 18, 2021, in Istanbul also support this opinion. Therefore, it may surely be assumed that the function of Said Shamil at this last point of resistance was limited with moral and motivational support deriving from the name of his grandfather.

Following the victory of the Red Armies in the entire Caucasus in February 1921, Said Shamil was obliged to return to Asia-Minor after staying some time with Najmudin from Gotsatl (Gotsinki). However, an undeclared civil war was raging in the Entente-occupied Asia-Minor between the supporters of the Ottoman dynasty and the so-called nationalist groups that formed an alternative government in Ankara. Although qualifying this movement as «nationalist» has been widely accepted in historiography, it is very difficult to admit that this is actually the case. The resistance movement that has been flourished in Asia-Minor did not have a mono-national character. When one considers the other components of the national texture of the Ottoman society in Asia-Minor, it can easily be acknowledged that the resistance against the monarchist regime and the occupation forces of the Entente was of a multinational character. Although the decision-making mechanisms in the Ankara Government was mostly consisting of very strong individuals from the North Caucasian immigration such as the Abkhaz origin Chinc'e Hussein Rauf (Orbay) and Osset Kundukh Bekir Sami, some people in Mustafa Kemal's close circle used the Ethem the Circassian and Anzavur issues as a trump card to prevent the hegemony of the North Caucasian émigré groups in the government. In addition, the hatred towards the Entente and the Soviets'

promises of support caused a rapid spread of sympathy for Bolshevism in the entire Asia Minor. Similar to the other representatives of the Government of the former Republic of the North Caucasus who has been seeking refuge in Asia Minor, the political climate in Asia Minor was making life more difficult also for Said Shamil as well, who was now declared as «hostile» by the Soviets.

Bolshevik highlander Najmudin Samurski Efendiev and the prominent communist leader Sergo Orjonikidze met Kazim Karabekir Pasha on the border of Alexandropol (today Gyumri) in mid-May 1921 and requested him to extradite Said Shamil to them, who was known to have fled to Turkey. Kazim Karabekir Pasha, on the other hand, stated that Said Shamil was wanted in Turkey as an Entente agent, and assured his Bolshevik interlocutors that he would be punished as soon as he was caught⁶. It is not clear yet if any prosecution or action was taken against Said Shamil in Turkey. It seems his case was most likely covered up by Said Shamil's cousin, Shaply Mehmed Shamil, the eldest son of Osman Ferit Pasha from his marriage to Gazi Muhammed's daughter Nafiset Shamil. Mehmed Shamil has been known for his active involvement with Turkish secret services and he was famous for being one of the founders of one of the biggest sports clubs of Modern Turkey named «Besiktas». Due to the continuous pressures of the Soviets, homes of all Soviet opponents in Turkey were raided and searched in later times including Said Shamil's one, but no single legal action was taken against him⁷. Right after Said Shamil returned to Asia Minor, he went to Samsun, which was home to large North Caucasian immigrant groups, and tried to gather volunteers for an uprising to be organized in the Caucasus. The Soviet allegations that claim these activities were allegedly carried out with the approval and financial support of Kazim Karabekir Pasha are not confirmed in Turkish sources or Memoirs of Pasha himself. However, The Soviet spies, who infiltrated the volunteers provided regular information to the Soviet Consulate in Trebizond due to Said Shamil's imprudent behaviors and ensured that precautions were taken⁸. The Soviet intelligence reports state that Said Shamil had visited Kazim Karabekir Pasha in Kars and stayed there for 6 days in August 1921. The reports also claim that he presented the plans for a revolt to be organized in the North

⁶ Советский Дагестан. 1921. 13 мая.

⁷ Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine (BDIC). MFM. 881. Bobine 195.

⁸ Архив внешней политики Российской Федерации. Ф. 301. Д. 16. Л. 422, 424.

Caucasus, but his proposal was found untimely and not accepted by Kazim Karabekir. The Soviet allegations that assert the Turkish Government paid Said Shamil 700 Turkish liras salary for 2 months cannot be verified in Turkish sources either. Kazim Karabekir sent his young guest away to Erzurum because he was worried about the deterioration of relations with the Soviets. After being kept idle in Erzurum for two months Said Shamil applied to Karabekir with a letter where he avowedly threatened the Pasha that if he would not get a positive response to his plans, he would go to Istanbul and seek support for his plans from the representatives of the Entente. Kazim Karabekir, on the other hand, assessed Said Shamil's attempt not as a threat, but as a great opportunity. In order to learn about the policy of the French, he suggested that he must visit Kundukh Bekir Sami Bey in Paris and had contacts with both the Caucasian political emigrants and the French Government⁹. In this way, while Ankara Government collected information about the politics of France and England on the one hand, ensured that Kundukh Bekir Sami Bey did not remain uncontrolled in Europe, thanks to Said Shamil on the other. Thus Said Shamil made his first steps to become a prominent member of the political emigration of the North Caucasus with the support of the Turkish Government. Nevertheless, once again the correspondence traffic of the immigration leaders on the Paris-Trebizond line was also captured by the Soviet Consulate in Trebizond and the planned actions were prevented while they were still in the design stage due to Said Shamil's imprudent behaviors. Besides having the chance to take early measures against the plans of the émigré groups, The Soviet administration also had the chance to increase pressure on the Ankara administration.

The French continued to provide financial support to Said Shamil until October 1922. However, Said Shamil could not carry out any concrete performances other than writing the messages with the title of «The Leader of Defense and National Assembly of the North Caucasus», which he attributed to himself. After a while, the French started questioning the support and stopped it¹⁰. Not long after the French cut off financial support, Said Shamil found himself a new strategic partner. In an OGPU report dated August 25, 1923, it was emphasized that the Poles focused on the Caucasus and that since June 1923, a project has been carried out through the Polish

⁹ Ibid. A. 430, 437; *Avagyan A. Türk Dış Siyasetinde Kuzey Kafkasya Muhacereti (1920–1971)*. Istanbul, 2013. S. 84.

¹⁰ AMAEF. Ser. Z. Car. 653. Dos. 2. F. 181–184.

ambassador to Istanbul to bring North Caucasian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian politicians together. One of the Poles' allies among the highlanders was Said Shamil¹¹. After the preparatory works, which lasted for about a year, towards the end of 1924, it was decided to establish a formation called the «The Union for Liberation of The Caucasus» in Istanbul with the initiative of the Polish ambassador Roman Knoll¹². Said Shamil was one of the most important building blocks of this union. He had established a strong friendship with Colonel Tadeusz Schaetzel, the military attaché of the Polish embassy in Ankara. He tried to impress the Poles by conveying ordinary information from the Caucasus as if it were of critical intelligence value¹³. The difference between the intelligence capabilities of the Soviets and those of the anti-Soviet forces was quite striking. While the Soviets were able to follow every single movement of the opposition groups, and be aware of everything, Polish diplomats were processing the out-of-date information they received from Said Shamil as if they were instant intelligence information¹⁴. This situation would become even more stunning in the future. Said Shamil, in a letter to Colonel Schaetzel on April 21, 1927, took advantage of the Colonel's lack of general knowledge, and proposed to form a Circassian Cavalry Detachment in Syria. Such a regiment had existed in Syria since 1922 and had been founded by Philibert Collet, one of the commanders of the French mandate administration. Said Shamil was bringing this to the attention of Colonel Schaetzel as if it has been a new project developed by himself¹⁵.

Said Shamil's source of information in the North Caucasus was Ahmethan Miserbiev who signed his letters under the pseudonym «Nart». There is no complementary information about Miserbiev available in the archives. He was one of those who disappeared in the depth of history like many other highlanders of the same era. Miserbiev in his letters to Said Shamil has offered to stop the politics and to take radical action in the North Caucasus as soon as possible¹⁶. Such motivating letters have excited the Polish diplomats who were in contact with Said Shamil. During the trial of Najmudin

¹¹ Мамулия Г., Абуталыбов Р. За свободу и независимость Кавказа. Париж–Баку, 2020. С. 48–52.

¹² Кавказская Конфедерация в официальных декларациях, тайной переписке и секретных документах движения «Прометей». Сборник документов. М., 2012. С. 7–8.

¹³ Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie (AAN). Sygn. A II/33. L. 605–606.

¹⁴ Ibid. L. 625–628.

¹⁵ Ibid. L. 284–286.

¹⁶ Ibid. L. 629–647.

of Gotsatl, one of the NKVD allegations against him was a letter said to be received from Said Shamil. He was blamed for reading that letter to the representatives of mountain auls of Chechnya on April 15, 1924, and tempting people for an uprising by promising that a large number of weapons would be coming from Said Shamil. However, there has been no evidence of such a letter in the Soviet archives. So it is highly probable that the allegation was purely a design of NKVD. But on the other hand, this can be taken as a strong sign that the communists continued to make use of Said Shamil's name against the local population for possible future malice¹⁷.

Said Shamil was cooperating with the Polish in a scheme similar to a boss-employee relationship. He was trying to position himself above his compatriots by presenting himself as the only interlocutor of the Polish sponsors. For example, in a letter he wrote to Tadeusz Schaetzel on March 9, 1926, which he simply carbon-copied to the other leading members of the Caucasian émigré groups, he submitted the Polish diplomat a report on his trip to Trebizond. There, he was reporting that he had established an information center consisting of people he had been with during his days in the Caucasus, which would work in connection with the other centers like Batumi and Tbilisi. He was also stating that he has obtained passports and visas from the Soviet consulate in Trebizond for his agents who would go to the Caucasus. So, as emphasized earlier, it was not surprising that the Soviet Consulate in Trebizond knew all about Said Shamil's activities and contacts in Turkey¹⁸.

As a result of the pressures of the Poles who forced the Caucasian political émigré groups to work under a single roof as a center on the axis of Poland, the Caucasus Independence Committee (Комитет независимости Кавказа — КНК) was established in Istanbul on July 15, 1926. Said Shamil was also among the North Caucasian representatives together with Alikhan Kantemir¹⁹. Having the full support of the Poles, Said Shamil was trying to rule out other North Caucasian politicians by establishing hegemony in the KНК. Alikhan Kantemir had been commissioned earlier for an intelligence and propaganda work on the Soviet border with the decision of the Committee in March 1925. Later, Said Shamil claimed that Kantemir was spying for the Soviets during that duty, and initiated an investigation against

¹⁷ «Совершенно секретно»: Лубянка — Сталину о положении в стране (1922–1934 гг.). Т. 2. М., 2001. С. 85–108.

¹⁸ ААН. Сгп. А II/33. Л. 625–628.

¹⁹ Кавказская Конфедерация... С. 13.

Kantemir. He also claimed that some other Mountain intelligentsia from the Turkish immigration, such as Tambiy Elekhoti, Pshimaho Kotse (Kosok), Djemaleddin Musallayev, Muhammed Kotiev (Mehmet Ketey), Kumuk Aydibulov and Ali Malikov, were in contact with the Soviet intelligence as well²⁰. Although there was no evidence to prove the allegations in line with the investigation of the suspects by the Polish counter-intelligence (Ekspozytura II) and the statements of the suspects, there was a serious erosion of mutual trust. For example, in the report of the Polish secret service dated July 21, 1926, there was a note about Kantemir: «A dubious type of business with the Bolsheviks, a man to get rid of».

Shamil, in every possible way discrediting Ahmet Tsalykkaty (Tsalikov), tried to create the impression in Colonel Schaetzel that he and his supporters were the most promising representatives of the highlanders for cooperation for Warsaw. However, as reported to Warsaw by the well-known members of North Caucasian émigré groups such as emigrants Muhammed Abukov, Aytok Namitokov, Tausultan Shakmanov, Ismail Shakov, Warsaw had known well that the Popular Party of the Free Mountaineers of the Caucasus was created and headed then by Tsalykkaty²¹. In 1932, Barasbi Baytugan, Secretary of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Popular Party of the Caucasian Mountaineers, sent a note entitled «The history of the emergence and development of the People's Party of the Highlanders of the Caucasus» to Warsaw, where he asserted that the Popular Party of the Caucasian Mountaineers was born in Prague in November 1926, entrusting Said Shamil the formation of its Central Committee with the simultaneous election of its general secretary²². This point of view, widespread first in political emigration, and then in historiography, does not correspond to historical facts. This party had been founded and headed until 1927 by Ahmet Tsalykkaty. Said Shamil had been elected as the General Secretary of the Party of Free Mountaineers of the Caucasus (Народная партия вольных горцев Кавказа — НПВГК) with the resources and support provided by the Poles. Using

²⁰ Российский государственный военный архив (РГВА). Ф. 461-к. Оп. 1. Д. 371. Л. 1–4; Д. 350. Л. 1–7; Д. 352. Л. 1–5; Д. 357. Л. 1–3; Д. 360. Л. 1–24.

²¹ Исхаков С. «Прометей» и мусульмане Кавказа, Крыма, Поволжья, Туркестана и Урала // *Ruch prometejski i walka o przebudowę Europy Wschodniej (1918–1940)*. Warszawa, 2012. С. 256.

²² Исхаков С. «Кристаллизация» горского освободительного движения. Размышления Б. Байтугана об истории мусульман Северного Кавказа и Дагестана // *Вопросы истории*. 2001. № 5. С. 20.

its publishing power, the party did not refrain from criticizing The Provisional Unity Committee of Azerbaijan and North Caucasus under the leadership of Chermoyev, Bammat, Topchubashev²³. The Poles were very uncomfortable with the tension between the diplomatic representatives of the Caucasian Republics in exile in Paris, the Polish-backed Georgian Mensheviks, the Azeri Musavatists, and the 23-year-old young Mountaineer Said Shamil²⁴. The Poles further increased their support for this group, and with the personal assistance of Marshal Pilsudski, Said Shamil founded The Popular Party of the Caucasian Mountaineers (Народная партия горцев Кавказа — НПКК) in Warsaw on November 18, 1926²⁵. On the other hand, the émigré groups based in Turkey had established the Democratic Caucasian Mountaineers Party under the leadership of Haydar Bammat. While Pilsudski supported the Menshevik and Social Democratic groups compatible with his political inclination, he supported the former Tsarist army officers and politicians among the Mountaineers who were once the defenders of the Russian monarchy and now gathered around Said Shamil. The financial support of the Poles was a great blessing for Said Shamil and the NPGK. This financial aid contributed not only to the activities of the party but also to the living expenses of the senior management of the party. In this way, the people in the top management of the party were able to earn their living without dealing with any other profession. This vital issue also appears in the official correspondence between the party leadership and Polish diplomats when the payments were occasionally delayed by the Poles. For example, Hussein Kumuz, one of the senior profiles of NPGK in a message sent to Tadeusz Holowko before Christmas 1927 (19.12.1927), he complained about the delayed financial support and developed his argument with the following striking words: «Our organization nominated Said Shamil, the grandson of Imam Shamil, at the forefront of our organization not only because he has a historical name, but also because he is truly and sincerely committed to our idea and has the strength and energy to accomplish the mission. He is the profile of a true revolutionary, the quality we do not have in any of our old, slow-motion leaders»²⁶.

²³ *Targalski G.* Les plans polonais concernant l'éclatement de l'URSS, le mouvement «Prométhée» et le Caucase // Bulletin de l'Observatoire de l'Asie centrale et du Caucase. 1997. No. 3. P. 11.

²⁴ РГВА. Ф. 461-к. Оп. 1. Д. 245. Л. 7.

²⁵ *Байтуган Б.* Знаменательная дата // Горцы Кавказа. 1931. № 26. С. 4.

²⁶ AAN. Sygn. 6687. L. 111–112.

Backed by this support, Said Shamil publicly challenged the Caucasian Republic's diplomatic representatives in exile in Paris on January 13, 1927, in a letter that he signed as General Secretary of the Popular Party of Free Mountaineers of the Caucasus. Said Shamil in his letter declared that his party was the only real organized force among the North Caucasian immigration, and accused the former politicians of the Republic of the North Caucasus of being lazy and monopolizing the leadership²⁷. In a similar letter that he had written to Tadeusz Schaetzel on November 4, 1926, referring to the founders of the Republic of the North Caucasus, he was saying «exun-professional politicians who try to put their duties on our shoulders will see that this will not happen». Said Shamil was aiming to create a negative perception in the eyes of the Poles about those whom he saw as his political rivals. For example, he was claiming that Aytek Namitokov and Murat Khatagogu had found a compromise with the Soviets and would return to the Caucasus soon²⁸. However, neither Khatagogu nor Namitokov had any plans to return to the Soviets or flirt with the communists in this direction. These were just false allegations spread by Said Shamil to achieve to be the sole ally for the Polish sponsors.

The founding declaration of the NPVGK was demonstrating exactly the same ideals voiced by the «former professional politicians» who Said Shamil considered as political rivals. However, the party at later stages was going to contradict these ideas in practice²⁹. In another letter he was writing to Colonel Schaetzel just two days later, Shamil asserted that he would force Bammat and Chermoyev to join his formation and that if they did not accept, he would politically destroy them, deeming them «impotent». On the other hand, he was also attacking Ahmet Tsalykkaty by blaming him for writing articles against the Poles in the magazine «Caucasian Mountaineer» («Кавказский горец») in Prague, and for being still a loyal member of the Russian Socialist Party³⁰. Seeing the Pole's demeanor towards the Caucasian political émigré groups was shaped according to the guidance of Said Shamil, Haydar Bammat wrote a letter to Tadeusz Holowko, one of the leading ideologists of the Promete movement and the Head of the Eastern Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland on December 13, 1926. While he was expressing his gratitude for the support,

²⁷ BDIC. MFM. 881. Bobine 195. No. 51. F. 1–3.

²⁸ AAN. Sygn. A II/33. L. 297–300.

²⁹ Ibid. L. 301–302.

³⁰ Ibid. L. 295–296.

he also harshly warned the Polish bureaucrat for supporting some factions among the Mountaineers in secret, backing certain individuals and using them for their own interests, and asked Holowko to give up this stance. He also stated that he would refuse the Polish financial support if their behavior would not change. He reminded Holowko who the initiator of the Caucasus Confederation ideals was by quoting from historical facts, and pointed out that the Polish government supported groups and individuals who tried to undermine these ideals in the past. On the other hand, Bammat underlined in a diplomatic way that the Polish financial aid as an ally should not mean the right of intervention in the internal affairs of the Mountaineers and reminded that the Mountaineers should make their decisions in complete self-reliance, without submitting to any domination, even by a friendly power³¹. Said Shamil, on the other hand, never gave up on trying to consolidate power in his hands and tried to eliminate different political tendencies and voices by mobilizing the party members in this direction to achieve his goal³². Even experienced Polish statesmen such as Tadeusz Holowko were influenced by the perception created by Said Shamil and displayed a biased attitude towards politicians labeled as dissidents³³. Said Shamil's influence on Polish statesmen was not limited to his North Caucasian rivals. Georgian and Azerbaijani politicians also got their share from Shamil's polemics. In a sectarian mood, he named the diplomatic representatives of the Caucasian Republics in Paris as «Paris Adventurers» and spent efforts to sow the seeds of hatred among them³⁴.

Said Shamil, with a populist move, to have a stronger representation in Paris against his political rivals, appointed Sultan Klych Girei as the representative of the Mountaineers' faction of KNK under his hegemony and the branch of the NPGK in this important European capital. Although Klych Girei had served in the Tsarist Army in the civil war he was known to be a great Caucasian patriot and no one could make a negative statement about his Caucasian identity³⁵. But the Council of Three, who did not take this fait accompli seriously, did not even invite Sultan Klych Girei to their meetings, nor did they share any information with him³⁶. Haydar Bammat, who, with all his goodwill, tried to attract Said Shamil to a com-

³¹ Ibid. Sygn. 6687. L. 41–46.

³² BDIC. MFM. 881. Bobine 195. No. 67. F. 1–2.

³³ AAN. Sygn. 6687. L. 50–52.

³⁴ Ibid. Sygn. A II/33. L. 287–292.

³⁵ BDIC. MFM. 881. Bobine 195.

³⁶ ПГБА. Ф. 461-к. Оп. 1. Д. 369. Л. 1–130.

mon working platform and tried to create an atmosphere of reconciliation through Pshimaho Kotse and Alikhan Kantemir in Istanbul³⁷. As an outcome of these efforts, a joint statement was signed and published by all parties³⁸. The Georgian leader Simon Mdivani's hopes were flourished when he met Said Shamil after the joint statement was announced and wrote a message to Tadeusz Holowko on August 21, 1927, stating that the North Caucasian National Center would be established very soon. However, this message itself was showing the symptoms that hopes would not last very long. Said Shamil was cheating Simon Mdivani by saying that he had attracted Pshimaho Kotse to his side³⁹. This was an indication strong enough to prove that Said Shamil would never leave his ambitions to consolidate all power in his hands.

Despite all the problems that accumulated in front of the political emigration of the highlanders, Said Shamil was eliminating and delaying all attempts at reconciliation and was addressing the convention to discuss the vital problems. Before such a meeting was convened, the KNK, under the domination of the Georgian Mensheviks, Azerbaijani Musavatists, and NPGK of Said Shamil, announced that they broke all ties with the Council of Three in Paris⁴⁰. This fueled further polarization between Said Shamil's NPGK and the Council of Three in Paris. The confederalists in Istanbul led by Alikhan Kantemir, and the Union of Caucasian Mountaineers (Союз горцев Кавказа — ЦГК) operating in Prague under the leadership of Ahmed Nabi Magoma approached closer the Council of Three in Paris and Haydar Bammatt. In the meantime, the Kemalist regime in Turkey banned all the activities of the anti-Soviet refugee organizations within Turkish territory in 1928. This was also another heavy blow on Said Shamil. In his report signed as «Faris Bek» to the board of KNK dated April 14, 1928, Said Shamil tried to put the responsibility of this blockage on his political rivals by accusing them of being «collaborators of the Ankara Government»⁴¹.

Said Shamil's next move undermined his own political career. Said Shamil, planning to strengthen the relations of the NPGK with international circles and Cossack political emigration, decided to invite ethnic Ossetian General Lazar Bicherakhov to the board of the party. Said Shamil made his plans without informing the party cadres and appointed Bicherakhov as the

³⁷ AAN. Sygn. 6687. L. 74–77.

³⁸ Ibid. L. 80–85.

³⁹ Ibid. L. 93–96.


⁴⁰ BDIC. MFM. 881. Bobine 194.

⁴¹ AAN. Sygn. 6688. L. 55–56.

highest political representative of the party in Europe. The announcement caused a huge scandal not only within the NPGK but also in Azerbaijani and Georgian national centers as well. Bicherakhov had fought against the Caucasian Islamic Army, armed forces of Azerbaijan, and the national forces of the North Caucasus Republic in Azerbaijan and Dagestan for almost nine months from March to mid-November 1918, causing much bloodshed with the support of the British Army and with the Armenian militia and Cossacks accompanying him. Bicherakhov's attempt to gain a place among the North Caucasian émigré groups and to infiltrate the structures struggling for the independence of the Caucasus was a serious irony. Said Shamil's audacity caused a great reaction first in NPGK before his external political rivals. The echoes of the scandal, which was initially disclosed by Sultan Klych Girei, on February 13, spread in all Caucasian political circles over time. General Sultan Klych Girei in his letter to the Presidents of the Azerbaijani and Georgian National Centers and the diplomatic representatives of the three republics in Paris on March 31, 1929, was stating that Said Shamil was ruling the party with a loyalist Ossetian clan instead of negotiating issues with the party cadres in Paris. He was claiming that Said Shamil was working behind the scenes with Bicherakhov, who has taken advantage of the youth and inexperience of Said Shamil and led the armed militants⁴².

After a while, Sultan Klych Girei wrote another letter to the leaders of the Caucasian émigré groups announcing that he would rather starve to death than cooperate with Bicherakhov and that he would resign from the NPGK central committee and the party membership because he could not be a part of such disgrace. Alikhan Kantemir, whom Said Shamil had accused of being a Bolshevik agent in 1927, was among those who severely condemned him as well. Kantemir, as the Secretary-General of the Republican Party of the North Caucasian Federalists, protested the scandal by organizing petitions and called on the national centers and diplomatic representatives of other Caucasian groups to take action against this humiliating situation. The NPGK held an extraordinary general assembly of the party on May 12, 1929, due to the reactions of the Caucasian Political circles and issued an 8-point decree after finalizing the investigations on the subject. Consequently, Central Committee members Mehmed Girei Sunsh, Bahaeddin Khursh, and General Bicherakhov were expelled from the party together with Said Shamil. It was also decided that they should be tried by the party disciplinary committee to determine the damages

⁴² BDIC. MFM. 881. Bobine 194.



General Sultan Klych Girei's letter about designs of Said Shamil with Lazar Bicherakhov.
March 31, 1929

they caused during their term of office⁴³. Despite being one of his closest allies in the Promethean movement, Mehmed Emin Resulzade was also among those who criticized Said Shamil most fiercely. After reminding the readers who Bicherakhov was with all historical details in his main article titled «The Caucasus Issue» published in the March 1929 issue of the Azeri-Turk Journal, Resulzade, presented the article titled «Honest Politics» criticizing Said Shamil's attitudes in the next issue of the same magazine. He also published some of the condemnation letters that were received from the subscribers of the magazine. After announcing the decree of the NPGK general assembly in the August issue, Resulzade had kept the issue live in the main agenda of the magazine for the next 6 months.⁴⁴

The gap that Said Shamil had caused during his post as the general secretary of the party could not be filled by the others after he left his position. Tapa Chermoyev's letter to Sultan Klych Girei dated April 5, 1930, was in-

⁴³ Les archives de Ali Mardan bey Toptchibachi. Bibliothèque du Centre d'études des mondes Russe, Caucasiens et Centre-Européen de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales. Carton 6-1.

⁴⁴ Kafkasya Meselesi // Azeri-Türk Dergisi. 1929. Sayı (24) 2. S. 1-2; Dürüst Siyaset, Neşredilmek üzere Şimali Kafkasyalılar Tarafından İdarehanemize gönderilen protesto suretidir // Azeri-Türk Dergisi. 1929. Sayı (25) 3. S. 3-4, 6-7; Şimali Kafkasya Mahfilinde, Avrupa'da Umumi Kafkasya İşleri // Azeri-Türk Dergisi. 1929. Sayı (26) 4. S. 7.


deed summarizing everything: «In August 1927, you and Said Shamil Bey, as representatives of the Popular Party of Free Mountaineers of the Caucasus, had a few private talks with me about the creation of a National Center of Caucasian Highlanders and its representation in the Caucasian Independence Committee and the Council of Three. These conversations in August 1927 were put on paper and also signed as a protocol. In signing this protocol, I was motivated only by the desire to eliminate the friction that has arisen between the various Highlander groups and to contribute to the unification of all political fractions. Unfortunately, I soon became convinced that Said Bey did not act on similar motives in his work. The condemnation of his behaviors in your relations has caused you to keep yourself distant from him and cut off all relations. Said Bey's activities caused a complete dissolution instead of the unification that I desired. Our disagreements and strife had never become so acute during my life in emigration. Unfortunately, I warned Said Bey many times to get better in vain. After the definite break with him and his failure to fulfill his obligations regarding Pshimaho Kotse, I told him during a personal conversation that I realized our protocol is no longer valid.

However, the other day, I learned that some Caucasian-friendly foreign circles were speculating on this document. In this respect, I do not want to take any responsibility, directly or indirectly, for this act of Said Bey, who has a character that is completely incompatible with neither our dignity nor the interests of our cause. I consider it my duty to confirm to you in writing that the protocol dated August 6, 1927, has lost its meaning long ago. I request you to give a copy of this letter to Said-Bek Shamil as well»⁴⁵.

Like the evidence of the arguments of Tapa Chermoyev, Said Shamil wrote a letter to Akakiy Chkhenkeli in October 1931 which clearly showed that he would not give up efforts to consolidate power in his hands and will never give a chance to any conciliatory and solution-oriented approaches with the other groups. In his letter, Said Shamil accused Chkhenkeli of organizing meetings with other political groups without consulting him, implying that he would not consider any movement that he was not involved in legitimate⁴⁶. Even the French, who supported Said Shamil during the 1920–1921 period, were now issuing reports with humiliating statements about him. The intelligence department report to the Paris Police Headquarters' dated August 4, 1931, consists of shocking expressions about

⁴⁵ BDIC. MFM. 881. Bobine 138.

⁴⁶ Ibid. Bobine 194.



The report of French intelligence about Said Shamil. August 4, 1931

Said Shamil. The French intelligence who was following every move of Said Shamil was claiming that he was a political adventurer who had no real ties with his fatherland and worked under the patronage of Polish intelligence. The report was also stating that the expenditures of this political adventurer have even been bothering the Polish General Staff and he has been visiting Paris to collect money from European politicians by presenting non-existing contacts and skills. The report allegedly claimed that he has been sharing the money that he has collected with three or four adventurers like himself and that he should be treated in the same category with figures such as Shkuro and Bicherakhov⁴⁷.

Although he was removed from the party leadership, the Poles spent maximum efforts to keep Said Shamil in the Promethean movement. In the meantime, an Armenian alliance formula was developed for the KNK to regain its functionality and to pull the NPGK out of its vicious circle. Said Shamil was given the role of organizing the talks and mediating the relations with Armenian political circles on the Promethean front's behalf. This was going to be a great opportunity for Said Shamil to repair his mortally dam-

⁴⁷ Préfecture de Paris. Police Department Box. BA 1703. Dossier n°163.627. Rapport n°484 R.C.S. 2/11, du 04.08.1931



Said Shamil (in the middle) together with Ayaz Iskhaki (on the left) and Musa Djarulla Bigi (on the right) at the Islamic Conference. *Jerusalem, 1931*

aged political career and prestige by the Bicherakhov scandal. However, Said Shamil was not able to use this opportunity and went beyond the limits of his assigned role when taking initiative and holding talks without informing the corresponding sides of the issue. Thus, he caused another huge scandal when the Armenian side publicly disclosed the minutes of their meeting with Said Shamil and caused controversy among the Caucasian émigré circles⁴⁸. After this event, Said Shamil was almost completely excluded from the political circles of the North Caucasian immigration. Said Shamil continued the anti-Soviet activities expected by the leadership of the Promethean movement in the Muslim Arab World. He attended the Islamic Conference held in Jerusalem on December 7, 1931, at the invitation of the Mufti of Jerusalem, Emin Al-Huseyni, and was elected a member of the presidential council of the conference as the youngest member. Shamil had a decisive role in the anti-communist decisions of many Arab states with his speeches and articles until the coming World War⁴⁹.

⁴⁸ Mamoulia G. Les combats indépendantistes des Caucasiens entre URSS et puissances occidentales. Paris, 2009. P. 134–136.

⁴⁹ Nevruz Y. Said Şamil'den Muhaceretteki Kuzey Kafkasyalıların 'Esir Vatan'ın Kurtuluşuyla İlgili Mücadelelerine Işık Tutan Tarihi Bir Mektup // Birleşik Kafkasya. 1995. No. 3. S. 49.



Said Shamil (in the middle) together with Ayaz Iskhaki (on the left) and Osman Hodjaoglu (on the right). *Warsaw, 1938*

Said Shamil had harshly criticized some of the decisions and practices of the party cadres when he was expelled from the party. One of these practices was the Caucasian Confederation Pact, signed in Brussels on July 14, 1934, which was signed with the Georgian Mensheviks and Azerbaijani Musavatists and whose legitimacy was discussed at the base of the North Caucasian political emigration. Said Shamil had revealed that he did not approve of this treaty with the statements like his political rivals⁵⁰. On March 7, 1936, in a meeting held in Paris between the Polish intelligence and the Paris headquarters of the NPGK, Polish intelligence brought some allegations that there was a rapprochement between Said Shamil and Haydar Bammatt's group «Kavkaz». This rapprochement greatly bothered the NPGK administration a lot. It was stated in the same report that Said Shamil wrote an article to be published in the group's publication. However, the article had been withdrawn for an unknown reason⁵¹. It can be presumed that the feeling of the discomfort arising from his rapprochement with Haydar Bammatt's group and the efforts of the NPGK administration to persuade him to rejoin the party to secure financial support from the Poles was effective behind the

⁵⁰ Ibid. S. 51.

⁵¹ II Rzeczpospolita wobec ruchu prometejskiego. Vol. 4. Warsaw, 2013. P. 363.

decision of withdrawal of his article. Barasbi Baytugan, who preserved his friendly relationship with Said Shamil, tried to persuade him to take the first step towards reconciliation with the Polish financiers. He wanted to use Balo Bilatti's trip to Turkey as an opportunity, and in his letter, he advised Said Shamil to return to the party by telling him to leave his «childish whims» aside. Said Shamil would also agree to return to the party to take advantage of the Warsaw-sourced loans⁵². Said Shamil, who was welcomed back to the party, has attended the general assembly of the Promethean movement held in Paris between May–June 1938 and signed the final declaration as to one of the NPGK delegates⁵³.

Said Shamil was in Warsaw when the Germans started to invade Poland. After the shock of the first wave of attacks, he managed to leave Poland and go to Beirut⁵⁴. There are allegations that he tried to establish contact with the Germans through intermediaries in August 1941, but the Eastern Ministry did not respond to this attempt. Franz von Papen, the German Ambassador to Turkey included the name of Said Shamil in his list of the representatives of the Soviet enslaved nations which he has sent to Berlin. The Germans distanced themselves from Said Shamil due to his Promethean connection and tried to gather further intelligence about him through some Muslim leaders. While the Chief Mufti of Jerusalem gave his assurances about Said Shamil, the former Prime Minister of Iraq, Rashid Ali al-Geylani, expressed his reservation by saying «Said Shamil is a person who should be kept under close surveillance due to his uncontrolled mood». This caused the Germans to have continuous doubt about Said Shamil. Just like his former relations with the Poles, Said Shamil tried to be the only interlocutor also for the Germans in these negotiations and requested help from Turkish president Ismet İnönü to eliminate his political rivals⁵⁵.

The prominent German diplomat Friedrich-Werner Graf von der Schulenburg organized a series of meetings with representatives of the Soviet enslaved nations in April 1942. The series of conferences were named «Adloniade» because of the famous Adlon Hotel in Berlin where both the guests stayed and the conferences took place. Said Shamil who was included in the guests' list of von Papen with recommendations of the Turkish foreign

⁵² ПГБА. Ф. 461-К. Оп. 1. Д. 369. Л. 16–25, 29–43.

⁵³ Ibid. Оп. 1. Д. 367. Л. 16–18; Оп. 2. Д. 39. Л. 68–70.

⁵⁴ Nevruz Y. Op. cit. S. 53.

⁵⁵ Mühlen P. von zur. Zwischen Hakenkreuz und Sowjetstern. Der Nationalismus der sowjetischen Orientvölker im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Dusseldorf, 1971. S. 67, 120, 121.



Said Shamil. *Istanbul, the 1940s*

ministry and Chief Mufti of Jerusalem arrived in Berlin to participate in the talks on May 11, 1942. One of Said Shamil's well-known opponents Haydar Bammat was also present in Berlin for the talks and stated that Vassan Girey Jabagi was among the guests, but that he refused to attend the conference to avoid being in the same place with Said Shamil. Said Shamil, to whom the North Caucasian guests were distant in Berlin, became an ally to the well-known politician of Azerbaijan, Mir Yakub Mehdiyev⁵⁶. Shamil hoped that he could convince the Germans of the independence of the North Caucasus and started the negotiations with overly optimistic expectations. Shamil's negotiations with the Germans continued for 6 months. Although the details of these negotiations are unknown yet, it is well-known that Said Shamil had left Berlin and returned to Istanbul when he learned that the Germans had created a unit called State Commissariat of the Caucasus as a colonial administration and that Arno Schickedanz was appointed as the head of this unit.

The Germans did not want to give any official status initially to the peoples of the east. But when things started to go wrong on the eastern front, at the conference held on October 5, 1943, they formally recognized the National Committees, which were established by the Soviet enslaved peoples⁵⁷.

⁵⁶ Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv. E4320B#1991/243#1265*. Az.C.13.01061 P. Bammate Haidar. Dok. Nr. 30. Bl. 1-4; Nr. 31. Bl. 1-3; Dok. Nr. 36. Bl. 1-9.

⁵⁷ Mühlén P. von zur. Op. cit. S. 86, 96.

As per the initiative of Said Shamil, Lazar Bicherakhov came on the agenda of Caucasian émigré groups once again. Said Shamil has insisted on including him in the North Caucasian Committee where Ahmed Nabi Magoma was the chairing person and Alikhan Kantemir was the spokesperson. Shamil wanted the German intelligence to appoint Bicherakhov at the head of the Special Military Units (Sonderstab Kaukasus), which was going to consist of the soldiers of various Caucasian nations. Said Shamil was inexplicably persisting in his mistake that had ended his political career in 1929. As a result of the fierce objections of the Azerbaijani, Georgian and Armenian committees, especially the North Caucasian National Committee, finally General Bicherakhov was replaced with Sultan Klych Girei⁵⁸. Said Shamil who could not get what he hoped in the case of Bicherakhov once again did not show any considerable political activity until the end of the war.

After the war, Said Shamil has returned to the political scene with the formation of the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism (AMCOMLIB), which was founded by the USA in 1950. He was the favorite of Robert Dreher, the German origin director of the committee. AMCOMLIB's definition of Said Shamil was as follows: «He belongs to a famous family, he is rich and we want him in our ranks!». Said Shamil provided detailed reports to the U.S. officials about other leading figures of the North Caucasian political emigration. Although he was considered to be the best profile to meet the expectations of the USA, Said Shamil's lifestyle was causing a dilemma in the AMCOMLIB administration. Eric Kuniholm, a senior AMCOMLIB executive, was giving another striking narrative of Said Shamil. Kuniholm defined Said Shamil as a wanderer who scrolls around Istanbul, Medina, Mecca, Beirut, Cairo, and Geneva. Kuniholm was talking about the big banquet that Shamil has given for him on his last night in Istanbul and he was saying that the banquet was not the kind of feast one might expect from a «Muslim» leader. Kuniholm sarcastically emphasized the contradiction between Said Shamil's drinking choices and his identity as a Muslim leader, saying, «I was not disturbed with the vodka served one after the other, but I couldn't accept serving vodka in an ordinary water glass»⁵⁹.

While some of the North Caucasian political immigrants cooperated with the U.S. secret services in the anti-Soviet struggle, some figures be-

⁵⁸ Neulen H.W. An deutscher Seite — Internationale Freiwillige von Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS. Munich, 1992. S. 321.

⁵⁹ Johnson I. A Mosque in Munich. New York, 2010. P. 87–88.

longing to the former Promethean movement, which was under the influence of Polish political emigrants, collaborated with British MI6. On the other hand, Said Shamil in his letter to Tadeusz Schaetzl on September 17, 1951, implied that it was a big mistake to choose England as the center for the rebirth of the Promethean movement. He was insisting that the enterprise should be based in the USA and under the auspices of the Americans and that he would not take part in an initiative that was not under the aegis of the United States⁶⁰.

There is very little information about Said Shamil's activities in the period of the following 20–25 years. During this time frame, Said Shamil spent most of his time in Middle Eastern countries. On the one hand, Said Shamil, who preserved good relations with Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, tried to retain his ties with the North Caucasian immigrants in Jordan and Egypt. There has been no remarkable information about Said Shamil in the North Caucasian émigré publications of that period in Turkey either. Also, there has been not enough evidence yet that the USA cooperated with Said Shamil in the organization of anti-communist activities although it is widely known that the U.S. secret services carried out an extensive number of operations with North Caucasian individuals since these individuals were mostly chosen from the Soviet citizen Caucasian volunteers in the German army instead of the individuals whose ancestors left the Caucasus in the 19th century.

Said Shamil had spent most of his time in Turkey in the second half of the 1970s. His activities remained mostly in the cultural dimension. He passed away on March 21, 1981, in Istanbul, and was buried in the cemetery in Istanbul beside the other members of his family.

Although the sudden appearance of Said Shamil on the scene of the history of the North Caucasus in the 1920–1921 period may seem surprising, it is obvious that it was actually a deliberate choice made on purpose on higher levels. While there were many other knowledgeable and experienced profiles than him to lead the resistance against the Bolshevik occupation of the North Caucasus and to mobilize the masses, he was most likely chosen for this task within a certain plan and a strategy. This plan was probably made with the cooperation of the leading profiles of the ÇİTC, such as Marshal Deli Fuad Pasha and Shaply Hussein Tosun Bey, and the

⁶⁰ Archiwum Instytut Józefa Piłsudskiego w Londynie. 709/148/5/4 L. 286–288; 709/148/5. L. 74–75; 709/148/6. L. 1–12; 709/148/5/7 L. 355–357; 709/148/5/4 L. 248–250.

High Commissioner of the French occupation forces. The main lines of the plan were to implement the aims and strategies of the plan makers unconditionally and to ensure coordination between the plan makers and the forces of Najmudin from Gotsatl, who was one of the few resistance mechanisms still firmly standing in the North Caucasus. Although the advantage of his grandfather Imam Shamil's name was an important factor in the morale and motivation of the people, it could not be the only reason for choosing him for this task. If that would be the case, his uncle's son, a well-known Muslim intellectual, Zakhid Shamil would be much more suitable for this mission than 19-year-old Said Shamil. However, maturity, knowledge, and experience were not the qualifications required by the plan makers in this task.

Another assessment made about Said Shamil in the first days of his appearance on the stage of history is that he was a supporter of religious radicalism. However, this assessment of the liberal wing of the mountain intelligentsia was a reflection of the biased perception about Najmudin from Gotsatl due to the conflict at the 1917 Andi Congress where he was accused of being a radical religious by the secular members of the central committee. Najmudin from Gotsatl as being the host of Said Shamil in the Caucasus and the addressee of the French was the reason behind the attribution of radical fanaticism to Said Shamil. Although he was born in Arabia and is the grandson of Imam Shamil, he has never been known as a fundamental believer or performed all worships stipulated by Islam. Despite his young age, one of the most important lessons Said Shamil learned in the Caucasus, where he spent 7 months between 1920 and 1921 was that allies such as the French and the Poles, which historically lived under the constant threat of Russia, could allocate serious financial resources to the alliances for the anti-communist or anti-Russian activities. The archival findings prove that Said Shamil enjoyed these incentives very much and has been trying to gain control of such financial sources. Najmudin from Gotsatl, who undertook the patronage of Said Shamil during his stay in the Caucasus, must have understood this as well and did not want to leave Said Shamil alone with such financiers. His distrust of Said Shamil was visible from his assignment of Ahmethan Avarski, one of the respected commanders of the Wild Division, as the head of the commercial formation called «Anadolu Company», which was established in Istanbul to finance the resistance activities⁶¹. Said

⁶¹ Мухтаров У. Предания о Нажмудине Гоцинском в Чечне // Ахульго. 1999. № 3. С. 19–22.

Shamil's fondness for materialism has turned him into an incredible populist. The fact that the NPGK cadres consisted of people with very different political tendencies and that this party has made an alliance with the Menshevik Georgians and Musavatist Azerbaijanis, with whom ideologically this party should oppose, is a striking indicator of this populism. Therefore, Said Shamil did not refrain from including party cadres such as Tsarist supporters and Mensheviks, who sabotaged the statehood attempts in the North Caucasus during the 1918–1920 period. It can easily be seen the manifestations of this in some of his statements written in the last period of his life: «Indeed, this group of people, which we call high-rank army officers, kept repeating the prayer “May God Bless the Tsar” from the beginning to the end of the revolution, in a tone that could be said to be unconscious, was a purely spiritual perversion»⁶².

There was no doubt that Said Shamil's alliance with Bicherakhov, which marked the end of his political career, was not an accidental mistake made unconsciously. Said Shamil's frequent use of his legendary grandfather Imam Shamil's name often worked well. But in the course that had started with Bicherakhov's blunder, he consumed also that credit recklessly. Perhaps the greatest misfortune of Said Shamil was that he found himself in such a chaotic atmosphere at the very young age of 19. It was almost impossible for a young person who did not have enough intellectual maturity, knowledge, and experience of warfare to make his path correctly in such conditions. Somehow, Said Shamil has been dragged into some mistakes by a few leading people surrounding him, and these mistakes had become more and more acute over time.

Archival sources about Said Shamil's activities during the 20 years from the occupation of the Bolsheviks to World War II were almost unreachable in the dark and locked cells of the archives until recent times. The most surprising thing is that all significant political conflicts and scandals of the era were incredibly ignored by the people who were integral parts of the events, and in a way, they prevented transferring the knowledge to the next generations. Two main factors might have triggered such a brush-off. The moral values and nonwritten social discipline codes that are peculiar to the North Caucasian nations inhibit the disclosure of people's mistakes publicly. Instead, a socially well-disciplined mountaineer is expected to pay the price for his mistakes. One may easily witness the impact of this social code in the case of Said Shamil. Leaders of the mountain immigration must have

⁶² Nevruz N. *Op. cit.* S. 48–49.

left Said Shamil's mistakes to the healing power of time in order not to disturb the sacred memory of his grandfather. Preserving the anti-communist struggle front against attacks from the Sovietfolie groups may also be another important factor to cover up Said Shamil's mistakes. It must also be taken into account that the number of people who were influenced by the Soviet propaganda machine was not negligible during the cold war period. As same as the trends all over the World, North Caucasian immigration was also influenced by brainwashing attempts of communist groups. So, it is very much possible that the anti-communist groups would try covering up the mistakes of Said Shamil with the fear of weakening of resistance against manipulations of the Soviet side.

Thus, Said Shamil should be examined as a separate individual regardless of his grandfather's name. Otherwise, artificial efforts for the glorification of the name of Said Shamil can hurt the memory of many important political figures of the era who suffered because of his mistakes. If this can be achieved, then political and military figures of the North Caucasus during the period of revolutions and world wars can be evaluated more accurately. Above all, historical truths and wrongs can be analyzed more rationally about this controversial figure of the North Caucasian immigration if new archival documents would be released in the future.





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Keywords:

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САИД-БЕК ШАМИЛЬ... ГЕРОЙ ИЛИ ИСКАТЕЛЬ ПРИКЛЮЧЕНИЙ?



аид Шамиль, внук легендарного имама Шамиля, стал известен во времена одного из самых сложных периодов в истории Кавказа. Несмотря на то, что информации о нем немного, его имя стало одним из самых обсуждаемых в истории эмиграции народов Северного Кавказа.

Изучение личности, феномена Саида Шамиля всегда проводилось в рамках риторики героизма, и отвечающее научным требованиям изучение предмета было неосуществимо из-за отсутствия источников. В свете документов, найденных в архивных хранилищах Франции, Польши, России и США, данная работа имеет своей целью дать конкретную и основывающуюся на источниках статью об этой противоречивой личности в истории.

Ключевые слова: Кавказ, Саид-бек Шамиль, Северо-Кавказская республика, Горская республика, Союз горцев, Союз освобождения Кавказа, Гайдар Баммат, Тапа Чермоев, Народная партия горцев Кавказа, Прометейское движение.

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